The Submarine War against Sweden: Part III

US and UK operations in the 1980s: Twelve remarkable facts

Commander of the Surface Fleet, Captain Göran Wallén, on his flagship, the destroyer Halland, the captain of Halland, Commander Hans von Hofsten, and the Commander of the Coastal Fleet Rear Admiral Bror Stefenson, soon to become Vice Admiral and Chief of Staff on 1 October 1982. Von Hofsten wrote in his book (1993) that later Commodore and Rear Admiral Wallén was his most trusted senior officer. During the submarine hunt in October 1982, he was the regional naval commander.

[This article is using material from the chapter 2 of my Swedish book Det svenska ubåtskriget (The Swedish Submarine War), Medströms publishing house, Stockholm, 2019. References will be found in my Swedish book and only a few links are added in the text].

A nineth remarkable fact is the number of strange orders indicating Swedish high-level collaboration with the “intruder”. In early September 1982, weeks before the submarine hunt started, Admiral Bror Stefenson told Dagens Nyheter: “our capacity to hunt submarines is so low that the great powers may say: ‘You cannot defend your territory’. [… They] may put pressure on us and tell us what to do”. Similar to Carl Bildt, Stefenson indicated an upcoming Western operation in Swedish waters. And Stefenson added that on certain occasions it might be necessary to limit the use of force. We cannot always “respond by entering with full force”.

Chief of Intelligence at the Naval Base Commander Maurits Carlsson told the 2001 Submarine Inquiry that he believed that a small vessel had hidden under the stricken destroyer Småland in Hårsfjärden, at the island of Märsgarn. The crew of the small submersibles may even have used the stricken destroyers as temporary base. There were prints on the sea-floor under Småland. The Naval Analysis Group documents show that the submersible had a double keel. It had destroyed an electrical cable on the bottom. The Naval Base War Diary states reports for the night to 7 October, that there was observed an antenna in the water close to the stricken destroyer Hälsingland at Muskö a couple of kilometers further south. A reconnaissance force had indications of a small vessel moving close to the destroyer, and at 04:20 there were torches and voices on Hälsingland. The reconnaissance force demanded to enter the ship. But the Naval Base War Diary states that the night officer at Muskö Naval Base did not allow the reconnaissance force “to enter the ship until it is light.” The Staff was apparently instructed not to touch the destroyers, while it was dark. The destroyers might have been used as a base for a force playing the “enemy” in agreement with some Swedish admirals. Admiral Kierkegaard did not allow Hans von Hofsten, the captain of the destroyer Halland, to use his ship that had been retired a few days earlier. His anti-submarine warfare capability should not be used, von Hofsten wrote. At lunch on the 7 October, Chief of Defense General Lennart Ljung ordered Brigadier General Lars Hansson to use the most lethal weapon, the 600-kilo mines, against the escaping submarine. Ljung received support from Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin and from Olof Palme (to become Prime Minister the following day). The first mines were detonated after lunch. This made a senior naval officer call von Hofsten’s office to reach Admiral Stefenson. When Stefenson answered the telephone, he was upset: “We had an agreement not to use the mines”, he said, but von Hofsten did not want to reveal the other senior officer’s name. It was not Admiral Kierkegaard, who he had criticized publicly but a most trusted senior officer (von Hofsten 1993). Neither General Ljung nor District Commander Lieutenant General Leander, or the Chief of Stockholm Coastal Defense forces, Lars Hansson, was aware of any such “agreement”. Some admirals seem to have run their own operation with a friendly navy. Stefenson asked Hansson who had given him the right to the use the mines. In the evening the same day, a patrol boat Väktaren followed a mini-submarine out from Hårsfjärden. Väktaren received perfect contact with the vessel and demanded to use depth charges. At that moment, she was ordered “ceasefire” at the request of Admiral Stefenson. On 11 October, the mine troops were ordered “ceasefire” for the mines at the request of Stefenson. On 13 October, Stefenson denied Hansson and the local commander Sven-Olov Kviman the right to use the mines against an approaching submarine. Two hours after the passage, they were allowed to use the mines again. At the time, Hansson thought that Stefenson collaborated with the Soviets, but Stefenson had also raised the issue of a “NATO submarine”. Ambassador Ekéus’ Submarine Inquiry (2001) found that the pages about this event in the Defense Staff War Diary had been removed (in both the hand-written and printed out version). In 2004, Hansson concluded that the submarine was from the West: this was the only logical conclusion. He wrote a foreword to my Secret War book about “US and British submarine deception” (London: Frank Cass, 2004). Stefenson also intervened in other anti-submarine operations and stopped them. It seems to have been a Navy-to-Navy agreement of using a friendly “intruder”. This was not a Soviet operation.

In October 1981, when the Soviet Project 613 (Whiskey class submarine) S-363 (called U-137 in Sweden) went up on an island close to the Swedish Naval Base South in Karlskrona. A number of Soviet naval vessel including two destroyers went to the Swedish the territorial sea border. Ten days later, when S-363 was released by the Swedish Navy, it was received by the Soviet destroyers. In October 1981, there was a major Soviet naval force outside the Swedish territorial waters, while in October 1982 Swedish Military Intelligence told there was no Soviet activity. 

A tenth remarkable fact is the lack of Soviet activity in the Baltic during this major anti-submarine operation in October 1982. Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff Intelligence Björn Eklind, told me that he was confused. There was no worry or particular readiness on the Soviet side of the Baltic Sea. If the Swedish Navy was dropping depth charges and detonated heavy mines against “Soviet submarines”, there would have been a certain activity on the side of the Soviets, he argued. There was nothing. There was some increased signal activity, but this is just natural in connection with major events. The Naval Base East Intelligence Report for 9 October 1982 stated that there had been some naval activity and signal intelligence activity in connection with the Soviet Constitution Day on 7 October. The Soviet state vessel Prof. Uchov was given the right to pass Kvarken on 10 October on her way to Piteå in the very far north of Sweden. She will pass Kvarken on her way back on 14 October. There was a Soviet merchant ship ML Volgobalt 126 going east of Gotland from Bay of Finland along the Soviet coast to Gdynia in Poland. There was no Soviet naval activity linked to the anti-submarine operations in the Stockholm archipelago, the report stated. On the 11 October, the Naval Base East Intelligence Report still followed the Soviet vessel Volgobalt 126 along the Soviet coast. The Danish research vessel Dana wass visiting the Swedish city of Västervik. “There was no known Soviet naval activity in the vicinity [of the Stockholm Archipelago …] There was normal activity for the year”, the Naval base Intelligence Report stated. On 10 October, General Lennart Ljung writes about a radio amateur that had picked up a message, supposedly about a Polish submarine rescue vessel. The Swedish Signal Intelligence Agency, FRA (Försvarets Radio Anstalt) concluded: “it was not about submarines”, General Ljung wrote.

In October 1981, when the Whiskey submarine S-363 [U-137] was sitting on a rock outside Swedish Naval Base South in Karlskrona, there had been two Soviet destroyers and ten other Soviet naval vessels just outside Swedish territorial waters waiting to rescue the submarine, but now, in October 1982, during the much more dramatic events at Muskö, there was nothing. The Swedish Navy picked up a couple signals believed to originate from a Warsaw Pact submarine radar, but these signals might have been transmitted from international waters, the 1995 Submarine Commission stated. The same commission argues that several strong low-frequency transmitters had been transmitting on 11 October indicating orders to a submarine. Low-frequency transmitters are used to communicate with submarines, and I asked the former Director of the Swedish signal intelligence agency FRA and former Director of Military Intelligence, Major General Bengt Wallroth. He congratulated me on having found this information, but he said that they had not been able to identify the transmitters. However, the fact that FRA had been able to distinguish between different low-frequency transmitters with their specific frequencies would imply that they had been able to identify the transmitters that use their specific frequencies. In case NATO’s COMSUBEASTLANT (Commander Submarines Eastern Atlantic at Northwood outside London) would send an order to a submarine using the NATO VLF transmitter facility in Novik at Bodø in Northern Norway, the same order would be sent from a couple of other transmitters, perhaps from a British VLF transmitter and from the German VLF facility at Rhauderfehn outside Bremen to make sure that the submarine would receive the order. The fact that transmitters (with different frequencies) send an order at the same time would indicate usual procedures. The different frequencies would have made it possible to identify the transmitters. The claim that FRA had not been able to do this is difficult to explain. It would certainly not point to Soviet transmitters. The lack of activity on the Soviet side was not consistent with simultaneous Soviet operations in Swedish waters. This made me suspicious. It would definitely point to Western activity. The Danish Cold War History Inquiry (2005) found that Danish Military Intelligence had not been able to explain the submarine activity in Swedish waters. It was not consistent with other Soviet activities in Northern Europe. The Danish Cold War History Inquiry concluded that the submarines must have been from the West.

Mauno Koivisto (Finnish Prime Minister 1979-82 and President 1982-94) and Olof Palme (Swedish Prime Minister 1969-76 and 1982-86) and Ingvar Carlsson (Swedish Prime Minister 1986-91 and 1994-96.

Boris Pankin, Soviet Ambassador to Sweden (1982-90) and Soviet Foreign Minister (1991) and Yury Andropov Soviet General Secretary (1982-84) and Nikolai Ryzhkov, Soviet Prime Minister (1985-91).

The eleventh most remarkable fact is the Soviet arguments: the Soviets asked the Swedes to sink every submarine that enter Swedish waters. Soviet submarines may have operated in Swedish territorial waters from the 1960s, but Soviet admirals had said that their need for operations in Norway by far had exceeded any need for operations in Swedish waters. Director Naval Intelligence Bobby Ray Inman said that Soviet submarines sometimes entered Swedish territorial waters, but they were never responsible for any deep penetrations. We can conclude that only Western activity could explain the operations in Swedish waters. Soviet leader Yuri Andropov told Finnish President Mauno Koivisto already in June 1983 in connection with Koivisto’s first trip as a president to Moscow that he should tell the Swedes that they “should sink every submarine that enters their waters”, so that the Swedes could see for themselves who is responsible. It is not our submarines, Andropov said. Koivisto suspected “Western provocations”, he wrote. He told Prime Minister Palme about it in connection with the World Championship in Athletics in Helsinki in August 1983. The Swedish admirals gave their forces the right to use depth charges that had to hit exactly on target to be lethal. They did not allow the use of real lethal weapons like torpedoes, and they tried to stop the Coastal Defense forces from using the bottom-mounted mines. The Soviet ambassador to Stockholm (1982-90), later Foreign Minister Boris Pankin said: “if you think there are [submarines], just bomb them”. Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov told Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson in 1988: It is not our submarines. Just “destroy” them. But all these Soviet calls for sinking the intruder were not consistent with Soviet intrusions.

Declassified Internal documents indicate that Palme in May 1983 believed in Soviet intrusions, but after his conversation with Koivisto in August 1983, he never again pointed to the Soviets. In his book from 2008, President Koivisto refers to his talks with Andropov and Palme, and he pointed to the intrusions by Western submarines (with reference to my books). Later Chief of Defense General Bengt Gustafsson said that the Soviets perhaps believed that the Swedes were unable to hit the submarines, but the Soviet mini-submarine technology was “stone age” compared to the US Navy (when AS-28 Priz got in trouble at Kamchatka in 2005, the Russians asked for U.S.-UK assistance, and they succeeded to save the Priz). There was no Soviet capability for such advanced operations and no guarantee for a Soviet submarine to survive deep into Swedish naval bases. Soviet operations made no sense. There would be a diplomatic catastrophe worse than the “Whiskey on the Rocks” in 1981, while Swedish admirals always would be able to keep quiet about a friendly submarine in trouble. For the Soviets, to urge the Swedish Navy to sink the submarines make no sense, if these submarines had been Soviet submarines. One can almost exclude this alternative. At a Norwegian-Russian seminar in 1993, I mentioned the possibility of Soviet activity in Swedish waters. I received a 20 minutes’ lecture from former Deputy Chief of Staff Admiral Nicolai Amelko. At the time, I didn’t take him too seriously, but at the time I had talks with U.S. former Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger that made me change my mind. He confirmed U.S. activity. These arguments certainly point to Western activity. At a lunch I had with Schlesinger, he also spoke about the “Two Sweden”: the “Political Sweden” responsible for the official neutrality policy and the “Military Sweden” or rather some senior Swedish military officers that acted on its own in collaboration with the Americans.

The new Cabinett of President Ronald Reagan with U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (1981-87), and with Director of Central Intelligence William Casey (1981-87) standing behind him, a close-up of Weinberger (Reagan Libarary Photo), British Navy Minister Sir Keith Speed (1979-81) (SVT), and U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman (1981-87) in Vestfjord, Norway (photo O. Tunander).

A twelfth remarkable fact was that US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (1981–87) and British Navy Minister Keith Speed stated on Swedish TV (2000) that the West had operated submarines “frequently” and “regularly” in Swedish waters to “test” Swedish defenses after US–Swedish and British-Swedish “Navy-to-Navy consultations”. The “intrusions” were conducted after consultations with the Swedish Navy, Weinberger and Speed said. They were run as realistic exercises with Western submarines to test Swedish coastal defenses – exactly what the reading of the above orders of Admiral Stefenson and Admiral Kierkegaard indicated. Weinberger said:

“[I]t was very much to Sweden’s advantage and very much to NATO’s advantage that this was done. [The “Whiskey on the Rocks” showed that] submarines can get in where they are not wanted and that is exactly why we made this defensive testing and these defensive maneuvers to assure that they [the Soviets] would not be able to do that. […] Besides that one intrusion of the Whiskey-class submarine, there were no violations, no capabilities of the Soviets.”

Caspar Weinberger argued that there were no Soviet intrusions, but we had to increase the awareness on the Swedish side as a “defense against Soviet capabilities and Soviet intensions”. Britain’s Chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency Sir John Walker said to AP (2000) that the West was “allowed a certain number of intrusions during a given period”. Former British Navy Minister Sir Keith Speed confirmed Weinberger’s statement. The testing was conducted in Sweden, he said:

“[We used our Porpoise and Oberon-class submarines …] We would not necessarily say [precisely where, because] it wouldn’t have been very sensible neither from your point of view nor from ours. There might well be penetration [type] exercises. Can submarines actually get in and almost surface in the Stockholm harbor? Not quite, but that sort of thing. How far could we get without you being aware of it?”

Speed said: “[It was] the Chief of Defense Staff or the Flag Officer Submarines [that] told his Swedish counterpart”. This liaison would have been Admiral Stefenson, who had had both these positions, he had indicated upcoming Western submarine operations and he had been the officer ordering the cease-fires that in praxis let the submarines out (according to the Diary of Chief of Defense Lennart Ljung).

Ambassador Mossberg spoke with Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Henry Kissinger’s advisor on European Affairs, who confirmed Western operations in Swedish waters. Later, former US Secretary of Navy John Lehman told me that the decision about the Swedish operations that Weinberger had spoken about had been taken by a Deception Committee chaired by Director of Central Intelligence William Casey. The US did not just try to increase the defensive capabilities and the awareness of the Swedes. The intrusions were also about deception and PSYOPs, to change the mindset of the Swedes, to make them adapt to U.S. interests. Sunday Times asked John Lehman about the operations in Swedish waters, but Lehman responded: “It’s top secret for reasons you can well imagine”. I asked former Director of National Security Agency, Lieutenant General William Odom (1985-88) about the interview with Weinberger and about what Weinberger had said about using Western submarines to operate in Swedish waters “frequently” and “regularly”. Odom responded by just saying: “I am not going to speak about classified information”. He didn’t deny these operations. He just said that they are still classified. These statements above point to U.S. and British operations, and in future articles I may turn to statements made by the most senior U.S. and British leaders responsible for these operations.

Appendix: Interview with Caspar Weinberger, Swedish TV2, 7 March 2000 (Weinberger speaks here about NATO, but formally speaking it is more about “the West”, about the US and some Western countries, said General Vigleik Eide, former Chairman of NATO Military Committee. It is not about NATO as a formal organization. These operations were too sensitive to be run within the framework of NATO, he said).

SWEDISH TV: But isn’t it a political risk to send NATO submarines [actually Western submarines; they were not under NATO command] into Swedish waters?

WEINBERGER: Well, I think there were consultations with the Swedish Government. I don’t know of any time when there was an intrusion of which the Swedish Government was not aware. […]

SWEDISH TV: But on what level was this agreement with Sweden?

WEINBERGER: I don’t know if there was any specific agreement with Sweden. As far as I know there were consultations. I am not aware of any objections on the part of Sweden, or any of the other countries, except Libya there it was an obvious objection to certain claims of freedom of navigation. I don’t recall any formal agreement with Sweden. There may have been some before I took office 1981, and there may have been some agreement before this time. […]

SWEDISH TV: But the Swedes were chasing submarines all the time?

WEINBERGER: Well, it is normal for a country to assure that its sovereign waters are not intruded, not invaded. And NATO's job was basically to protect all those waters against an attack because an attack up there, that had succeeded, would threaten much more directly European sectors of NATO. But to my knowledge, there was no direct [US/Western submarine] intrusion or testing of Swedish waters or defenses without consultations with the Swedes. You are speaking of an agreement: I don’t think there was any agreement, but I think there were consultations, which led to an understanding that – for an individual case, for a specific situation, a particular maneuver – it would be an agreement that that could be done. It was very much in Sweden’s interest to have their waters protected. […]

SWEDISH TV: On what level were these consultations?

WEINBERGER: Generally, they were Navy-to-Navy, the US Navy to the Swedish Navy, I believe. The Swedish Navy is part of the Swedish Government, and the US Navy is part of the US Government. Responsible officials on both sides would have discussions, consultations and agreements would flow from that to make sure that they get all help needed to protect their sovereignty of their waters. If for example Sweden would have said that you must not have any intrusions of that area in this month that would certainly have been honored and respected by NATO.

SWEDISH TV: But other areas would then be ok?

WEINBERGER: Well, it depends entirely on the response of the officials in charge of the negotiations. What I am saying is that at no time, to my knowledge, did NATO simply send a submarine directly into Swedish waters without consultations and prior discussions and agreements that that could be done. Under those circumstances, it was not a pressing problem. It was part of a routine regular scheduled series of defense testing that NATO did and indeed had to do to be responsible and liable. [It would have been irresponsible] if they hadn’t done it.

SWEDISH TV: Were midget submarines included in these tests?

WEINBERGER: I don’t know the level. I don’t know the particular instruments used – whatever was discussed and consulted about. We had all different kind of submarines. We also had to know where all the Soviet submarines were at any time, and we also had the capability of doing that….

SWEDISH TV: Have you discussed this with the Swedish Defence Minister or Prime Minister?

WEINBERGER: Did I? No, I did not. But I am sure there were standing instructions […]

SWEDISH TV: When this ‘Whiskey on the Rocks’ submarine was in the middle of restricted area it took 12 hours for the Swedish Navy to notice it.

WEINBERGER: Well, it was a clear violation, and submarines can get in where they are not wanted, and that is exactly why we made this defensive testing and these defensive maneuvers to assure that they would not be able to do that without being detected. That particular submarine was in Swedish waters. It went aground in an area where it could not be denied that it was in Swedish waters. It was quite visible to everybody, and it was exactly the kind of thing that NATO was trying to test the defenses to not permit it to happen. It was very much in Sweden’s interest that that would not happen. […] The consultations and discussions we had were designed – with all countries not just Sweden – to assure that NATO was able to perform this mission and had ample opportunities to test through manoeuvres and other activities as to whether the defences were adequate and whether or not the Soviets were requiring any new capabilities that would require any changes in their defences or anything of that kind. So, the result of all that I think was very satisfactory. Besides that one intrusion of the Whiskey-class submarine, there were no violations, no capabilities of the Soviets to make an attack that could not be defended against, and that was the mission of NATO, and it required the cooperation of many countries. […] and I would say it was completely satisfactory.

SWEDISH TV: What you are saying is that you are not denying that US midget submarines went deep into Swedish archipelago areas?

WEINBERGER: It’s not a matter of admitting or denying. It is a matter of discussing the preparations that were taken to make sure defences were adequate against a Soviet attack. I have no idea whether midget submarines were used or large submarines or attack submarines or nuclear or whatever. The point was that it was necessary to test frequently the capabilities of all countries, not only in the Baltic – which is very strategic, of course – but in the Mediterranean and Asiatic waters and all the rest. […] We had to test from time to time to make sure that our defensive planning was adequate and up to date and capable of resisting any changes in Soviet strength and Soviet capabilities, and that was done on a regular basis. And it was not just done in the sea. It was done on air defenses and on land defenses, and it was done to protect possible landing areas. The whole thing was done satisfactory, and when I say satisfactory, I mean there was no Soviet invasion. That was the test.

SWEDISH TV: How frequently was it done in Sweden?

WEINBERGER: I don’t know, enough to comply with the military requirements for making sure that they were up to date. We would know when the Soviets acquired a new kind of submarine. We would then have to see if our defenses were adequate against that. And all this was done on a regular basis, and on an agreed-upon basis.